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A PROMINENT TWENTIETH CENTURY ACCOMPLISHMENT of international trade
theory was its theory of international trade agreements. Building on Harry Johnson’s classic
paper (1953/54), scores of contributions developed and elaborated what I call the “Received
Theory”. The deservedly influential work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) may justly be
seen as triumphantly completing the research agenda implied by Johnson nearly half a
century earlier.
A second strand of the Received Theory, emphasizing political economy, began in the
1980s. Grossman and Helpman (2002) expound its most widely used component.
However, two prominent puzzles draw into serious question the relation to reality of the
Received Theory and of the theory of trade policy that underlies it. This paper attempts to
resolve these puzzles.
I.  Introduction: The Two Puzzles
The central premise of the Received Theory is that trade agreements arise solely because
countries with market power are concerned, to at least some degree, with the fact that tradeTrade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 2
barriers, imposed for whatever reason, can move the terms of trade in their favor, shifting
real income there from the rest of the world.
As pointed out in Ethier (2004), the Received Theory is inconsistent with actual multilat-
eral trade agreements, which do not prevent countries from trying to influence their terms of
trade. I refer to this discrepancy as the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
Nothing in the GATT prevents a country from implementing export taxes. In their
schedules of negotiated concessions, countries have bound their import taxes: They have not,
with very rare exception, bound export taxes. If the EU, for example, were to decide, for
whatever reason, to impose aggressively a set of export taxes that could improve its terms of
trade, its outstanding multilateral trade obligations would not prevent it from doing so.
The more sophisticated and realistic contributions to the Received Theory — such as 
Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) — allow governments to be concerned primarily with any
number of internal or political-economy objectives that relate to the domestic relative price
of imports in terms of exports. This price can be manipulated unilaterally with trade policy,
but, if a country has market power, such manipulation will impact the terms of trade,
creating an international externality that shifts part of the cost of the policy onto the rest of
the world. Dealing with this terms-of-trade externality is the sole reason for trade agreements
in these models.
Large countries will negotiate only trade agreements that constrain terms-of-trade
manipulation. Trade agreements that do not do this would, for no reason, surrender the use
of trade policy for domestic objectives. In reality we observe exactly the opposite. Countries
negotiate trade agreements that do not prevent terms-of-trade manipulation, and do not
negotiate multilateral agreements that would prevent it.
An interesting  feature of the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle is that it has been ignored in the
international trade theory literature. For over four decades, successive GATT rounds have
produced trade agreements that do not prevent terms-of-trade manipulation while trade
theorists have produced theories of trade agreements in which such prevention is the sole
object. More often than not, these theories have been based on two-good models in which an
import tariff is completely equivalent to an export tax. Thus the GATT has been analyzed in
a context in which the actual GATT would be completely meaningless! As far as I can tell,
over these four decades no one has ever noted or addressed this problem.
The second puzzle was emphasized by Rodrik in his survey (1995, p1476-7): “why is
trade policy systematically used to transfer resources to import-competing sectors and
factors rather than to export-oriented sectors and factors?” He concludes, “[o]n this puzzle
we get very little help from the literature.” Indeed, Levy (1999, p 346-7) argues “that in a
symmetric version of the Grossman and Helpman” (1994, 2002) “model, export subsidiesWilfred J. Ethier Page 3
exceed import tariffs in sectors with lobbies. ... Thus, this approach to modeling political
economy may explain trade promotion rather than trade protection!” I refer to this as the
Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
In sharp contrast to the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle has been
widely recognized. But it has not been successfully addressed. Papers dealing with the
political economy of trade policy typically either ignore this problem or eliminate it by
arbitrarily constraining the ability of the government to adopt export-promotion policies.
One approach is simply to assume, in a political-economy model, that import-competing
sectors organize politically while export sectors do not. This is convenient but arbitrary.
 Another approach is to rule out export subsidies by pointing to countervailing-duty laws,
whose existence are not explained. Indeed, I confess to having done this myself (in Ethier
(2004)). This accords well with reality but suffers from the fact that the countervailing-duty
laws are themselves essential components of the commercial policy that is to be explained.
These two puzzles are not just puzzling with respect to the trade-theory literature: They’re
puzzling in relation to each other as well. A natural response to the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle
would be to deny the practical importance of the terms-of-trade externalities upon which the
Received Theory has been erected. But the Received Theory can offer a ready explanation of
the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle: terms-of-trade externalities!
Ethier (2004) argued that a theory of trade agreements based on political externalities
could resolve the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle. That paper assumed away terms of trade externali-
ties, and its analysis of political externalities was not based on an explicit microeconomic
model. Here I confront the puzzles directly by going beyond that preliminary effort in four
ways. First, I develop such a microeconomic model. Second, I complement the earlier paper
by introducing a different type of political externality. Third, I allow an interaction between
political and terms-of-trade externalities. Fourth, I explicitly allow export subsidies in order
to address the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes an economic model, and the
following section adds a model of lobbying. The latter is based on the familiar model of
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002). For the reader’s sake, I stick as closely as possible to
Grossman-Helpman, departing only as needed for my own purposes or for simplicity and
clarity. I then show that, in a two-country context, my alternative approach delivers what the
Received Theory cannot: reciprocal trade agreements that do not necessarily constrain export
taxes. With sufficiently important political externalities, countries choose neither to tax nor
to subsidize exports. Thus I suggest answers to both puzzles. The concluding section
concludes.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 4
II.  The Model: Economics
Assume two countries (Home and Foreign), two factors (Kapital and Labor), and three traded
goods (0, 1, and 2). Good 0 is a numeráire good, produced by labor alone. Goods 1 and 2 are
produced by capital and labor, with capital specific to each of these sectors. H imports good
1 and exports good 2.
i Ownership of each specific factor is distributed uniformly over a fraction "  of the
population (labor force), with each individual owning some of one of the specific factors.
12 Normalize so that L = 1 = "  + " . Choose units so that a unit of good 0 is produced by a unit
of labor. Thus, assuming good 0 is actually produced, the wage w = 1.
Each individual in each country has preferences that can be summarized by the utility
i function where  c denotes consumption of good i. This implies
ii i i individual demand functions d = d(P), i = 1, 2, where P denotes the relative price of good i
in terms of good 0. Residual income is all spent on the numeráire good 0. I assume that
endowments in both countries are such that each both produces and consumes good 0.
ii Each country may tax either imports or exports. For H, let Q and P denote, respectively,
i the domestic and international relative price (in terms of the numeráire) of good i, and J  one
i plus the ad-valorem trade tax t. Thus  and  Analogous F variables will
be distinguished by asterisks.
International trade
Equilibrium in the world market for good 1 is represented by  . H’s
1 import tax and F’s export tax thus determine P , independently of sector 2. This in turn
implies the following.
andWilfred J. Ethier Page 5
(1)
where   and  .
Similarly, equilibrium in the world market for good 2 can be represented by
. Thus,
and
H imports of good 1 need not equal in value H exports of good 2: Trade balance is reached 
with a net exchange of good 0.
The population consists of two groups, distinguished by which specific factor they own.
The real income of each group is given by the following.
i Here B  denotes the income of specific factor i,  equals the trade tax
revenue (redistributed to the populace in lump sum fashion), and consumer surplus equals
Trade policy for welfare maximization
To establish a frame of reference, consider the trade policy that would maximize national
ii i i welfare Noting  that  B N = x (production of good i) and that sN = –d, the first-
1 order condition for the optimal choice of t  isTrade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 6
(2)
This in turn reduces to
the familiar optimum-tariff formula. Similarly, the condition  reduces to
If both governments use trade policy to maximize national welfare, the Nash equilibrium in
trade policy becomes the following.
Proposition 1 With welfare-maximizing governments, the Nash equilibrium in trade
policy is given by (2). Each government taxes both imports and exports.
Note the following.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 7
Surveys of the literature on the political economy of trade policy may be found in Hillman (1989), Magee
1
(1994), Nelson (1988) and Rodrik (1995).
ii Remark 1 Because of separability, the Nash equilibrium t and t* are jointly determined,
for each i, independently of the other two trade taxes.
Remark 2 Because the model has three traded goods, in the Nash Equilibrium each
country taxes both imports and exports of non-numeráire goods.
III.  The Model: Lobbying
I now introduce the political-economy side of my model.  My point of departure will be the
1
now-familiar model of Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2002).
Lobbies
12 I assume that "  and "  each organizes a lobby to bargain with the government over trade
policy and lobby contributions. By contrast, Grossman and Helpman (1994) allow some
sectors to be organized and some not.
As Austen-Smith (1991, p 84) points out, “ ... lobbying activity is predominantly not
financial, but rather to do with information transmission.” In a world of imperfect informa-
tion, a critical function of lobbying is to convey to the government information relevant to
possible policy choices. Each lobby possesses inside information regarding its own industry
and, therefore, presumably has a comparative advantage in lobbying about measures that
directly affect that industry. But acquiring significant expertise to enable it also to lobby
about policies directly influencing other sectors is costly. Thus lobbies in practice concen-
trate their efforts on influencing those policies that impact most directly on their members. I
11 2 capture this by assuming that "  lobbies the government only about t  and that "  lobbies only
2 about t . Nobody lobbies for policy regarding the numeráire good. Grossman and Helpman
(1994), by contrast, assume that each organized sector lobbies about all trade policies.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 8
i Each group "  organizes itself into a lobby to bargain with the government
i only about t. The government negotiates independently with each lobby.
(A1)
This assumption will be critical for the way in which political externalities function in my
model. The contrast with Grossman and Helpman (1994) can be characterized as follows.
In Grossman and Helpman, some sectors may not organize, but all organized sectors
lobby equally about everything. Here, all individuals and sectors organize, but no
sector lobbies about everything.
The assumptions that there are but two numeráire goods and that all sectors organize are
for expositional clarity only. Relaxing them would only complicate the algebra in ways
already familiar from Grossman and Helpman. Although the assumption that each lobby
addresses only one policy is more extreme than necessary, the idea that different lobbies
have different comparative advantages in addressing different policies is important for what
follows.
(A1) also contrasts with Ethier (2004). That paper likewise justifies political externalities
on the basis of imperfect information, but there the imperfection is a limited ability to
observe the link between economic outcomes and policy choices. Here the justification is
based on asymmetric information endowing distinct lobbies with distinct abilities to lobby
about different policies.
Trade policies and international externalities
11 1 The  "  lobby bargains with the government about t  and the contribution C  which that lobby
will make. Unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994), I assume the government’s objective
function gives no direct weight to national welfare. This will sharpen my results without
altering them in any essential way.
11 1 W  is the joint surplus of the government and the "  lobby associated with t . From (1), a
change in the latter produces the following effect on that joint surplus.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 9
(3)
The two bracketed terms within the braces on the right-hand side respectively reflect what
Grossman and Helpman (1995, p 688) refer to as the terms-of-trade and political-support
ii motives for trade policy. It’s clear from (1) that a change in t influences W in three ways:
through its effect on consumer surplus, on trade-tax revenue, and on the income of the factor
specific to sector i. The first two are deflated by the relative size of the i lobby, but the third
ii is not. Thus when t is manipulated to maximize W its effect on the income of the factor
i specific to sector i is relatively more important than when t is manipulated to maximize
1 social welfare. This accounts for the political-support motive. When the "  lobby coincides
1 with the entire population ("  = 1) this motive disappears.
11 A change in t  also has an impact on the analogous foreign joint surplus, W *,
The two bracketed terms within the braces on the right-hand side respectively reflect the
international terms-of-trade and political-support externalities of trade policy.
Remark 3 An increase in the Home tariff will exert a negative political-support
extternality on the Foreign government cum export lobby. The magnitude of the terms-of-
trade externality depends upon the Foreign export policy, and could be positive if exports
are subsidized.
Policy choice
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999), I assume the bargaining solution maximizes the joint
1 surplus W  of both parties. In doing so I am in effect assuming that the asymmetric informa-Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 10





tion, which presumably causes the asymmetric influence of the respective lobbies, does not
result in strategic behavior that precludes an efficient bargaining solution.  The first-order
2
condition for this implies the following Home tariff on good 1.
Note that, for the importable sector, the terms-of-trade and political-support motives
reinforce each other in the protectionist direction.
Turning next to the export sector,
2 Thus, if t  is initially zero,
Here the terms-of-trade and political-support motives work at cross purposes. If political-
support motives dominate, so that the right-hand inequality is satisfied, an export subsidy
2 would increase the joint surplus W . If, on the other hand, that inequality is violated, an
export tax is called for. So, the analysis has reached a fork in the road. To analyze the two
cases, consider the following assumption.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 11
(5)
(A2) in effect says that the political-support motive outweighs the terms-of-trade motive in
each country. Consider two cases separately.
Terms-of-trade dominance
 
Suppose, first, that both inequalities in (A2) are reversed. In this case, terms-of-trade
motives outweigh political-support motives, and an export tax is called for in each country,
though it will be less than if political-support motives were absent.
 If Foreign trade policy is derived analogously, the following Nash equilibrium in trade
policy emerges.
The formulae for export taxes yield positive values because of second-order conditions:
neither country would wish to operate on an inelastic portion of its partner’s import-demand
curve. We have the following.
Proposition 2 If (A1) holds and both parts of (A2) are violated (i.e., terms-of-trade
motives outweigh political-support motives), the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is
given by (5). It features both import taxes and export taxes by both countries.
To put this result in perspective relevant to the literature, note the following.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 12
The case where one inequality in (A2) holds and one is violated will be left to the dedicated reader.
3
Remark 4 If, as is the case here, all individuals and sectors organize in the Grossman-
Helpman model, their efforts cancel out and the governments implement welfare-maxi-
mizing policies (2): See Grossman and Helpman (1995, footnote11). My different result is
due to the assumption, in (A1), that organized sectors cannot lobby over all policies.
1 In my model no agent is concerned about cross effects, such as the effect on W  of a change
2 in t . If, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), the government gave some weight to national
welfare, it would take such cross effects into account. This would alter (5) to cause it to more
nearly resemble (3). But, as long as the organized sectors cannot lobby over all policies and
the government gives at least some weight to contributions, a distinction will remain.
Ignoring a possible government concern with national welfare simply sharpens that distinc-
tion.
Remark 5 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) ignore political-support effects, as I have defined
them, so that, in my terminology, terms-of-trade effects always dominate regardless of
how important the government thinks them to be absolutely. In my model, this implies
taxing both imports and exports, as indicated in Proposition 2. But Bagwell and Staiger’s
trade model exhibits Lerner symmetry, so that export taxes are redundant there, if import
taxes are not bound.
Political-support dominance
Next, suppose that (A2) holds,  so that political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade
3
motives. Consider an initial situation in which each country sets the import tariff called for
in (5), but neither taxes nor subsidizes exports. This situation is not a Nash equilibrium,
since, by (A2), (4) implies that either country can gain by an export subsidy. Now, suppose F
1 were to depart from this initial situation by imposing an export subsidy dt * < 0. Then an
11 1 1 1 1 increase in the H tariff of dt  = – J  dt * will hold Q  and Q*  (= P* ) unchanged. This will
111 1 maintain the initial situation except that R will rise by –  Q M d t*  and R* will fall by Q*
11 M d t* . Thus the real income of both interest groups in H rises, and the reverse in F. This
countervailing increase in its tariff will constitute H’s best response to F’s adoption of an
export subsidy. There is no Nash equilibrium in the four trade taxes themselves: We need
additional policy options.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 13
(6)
The above argument suggests what is appropriate. Suppose the H government decides on
12 the following policy triple: i the level of t , ii the level of t , iii whether to adopt (A = Y) or
1 not to adopt (A = N) a countervailing-duty provision. The H government bargains with the "
12 2 lobby over t  and A, and with the "  lobby over t . The F government behaves in an analo-
gous way.
If both inequalities of (A2) are violated (terms-of-trade motives dominate), decision iii is
redundant. The Nash equilibrium continues to be given by (5) and either country’s choice
under iii is irrelevant. But, when (A2) holds, viewing policy choice as a triple becomes
12 crucial. If H sets t  equal to its value in (5), sets t  equal to zero, and chooses A = Y, F’s best
response will be to behave analogously. I now have the following Nash equilibrium in
policy.
Proposition 3 With (A1) and (A2), the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (6)
and features import taxes and countervailing-duty laws by each country. Neither
country either taxes or subsidizes exports.
Note the following.
Remark 6 In contrast to the Received Theory, export taxes fail to emerge here because
governments choose not to implement them, not because trade agreements prevent them
from doing so.
This is due to (A1) and to the assumption, in (A2), that political support motives outweigh
terms-of-trade motives.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 14
Remark 7 Countervailing duty laws emerge here as the result of non-cooperative choices
by the two governments, not as a result of a trade agreement.
In reality it is true that the GATT, in Article XVI, attempts to curtail the use of export
subsidies and also provides a code of conduct regarding countervailing-duty laws for WTO
members. But such laws were in existence long before the GATT.
Remark 8 Proposition 3 offers a potential resolution of the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
The suggestion is that, in each country by itself, the government and the export lobby can
indeed increase their joint surplus by encouraging exports (given (A2)), but actually doing so
is not consistent with equilibrium in a two-country, non-cooperative, policy-setting context.
Remark 9 If political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade motives (A2), each
government is powerless to offer its export lobby anything in Nash equilibrium.
This will turn out to be the essential reason for trade negotiations. It’s crucial to realize that
this environment is not assumed: It’s a direct consequence of the requirements for Nash
equilibrium when political-support effects outweigh terms-of-trade effects.
IV. Trade  Agreements
Now suppose that the H and F governments can undertake negotiations for a trade agreement
that would stipulate the two trade taxes on imports. In the event of such negotiations, each
interest group would  lobby its government about the taxes in the agreement that pertain
11 2 directly to it. That is, "  would lobby the H government about t  and A, and "  would lobby
21 2 about its negotiating position regarding t* . And " * and  " * would lobby the F government
analogously. I first enquire whether there is any incentive for such negotiations.
Since Proposition 3 seems to accord much better with reality than Proposition 2, I impose
(A2), that political externalities dominate terms-of-trade externalities.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 15
(7)
(8)
The exchange of market access
1 Assuming (A2), a small change in t , from the levels set in (6), produces the following
1 effects on the gross real incomes of the two relevant interest groups, given that t  is set
2 optimally and that t * = 0 in (3).
11 1 Thus  dt  < 0 implies a first-order rise in W*  and only a second-order decline in W . An
2 analogous argument applies to t* :
So I have the basis for a trade agreement: If both countries make small reductions in their
import tariffs, each will experience a first order gain to its export sector but only a second
order loss for its import-competing sector. This is the rationale for a trade agreement.
Such agreements seek to exchange market access: I’ll grant your exporters increased
access to my market in exchange for increased access to your market for my exporters. See
Hillman (1982, 1990), Hillman, Long, and Moser (1995), and Hillman and Moser (1996).
The present analysis can be viewed as providing a formal basis for their approach. Here,
political externalities furnish the basis for such an exchange. The ability to bargain for
“concessions” from a trading partner furnishes the ability to deliver benefits to (and extract
contributions from) the export sector that would not be present unilaterally. The reason they
would not be present is that, in Nash equilibrium, the government can do nothing for itsTrade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 16
export lobby (Remark 9). This, in turn, is directly due to the dominance of political-support
motives.
Of course, maintenance of the trade-balance constraint would in any event require
1 changes in the trade volumes of other goods in response to a unilateral H reduction in t  and
12 2 consequent rise in M . But, if F does not also reduce t* ,  X  will not rise: Trade balance will
be maintained by a change in the amount of the numeráire good exchanged.
Both political-support and terms-of-trade motives feature in (7) and (8). But the domi-
nance of the political-support motive (A2) is important in two ways. First, by ensuring that
each government can do nothing for its export sector in the non-cooperative equilibrium it
establishes a basis for a trade agreement. Second, by ensuring that the non-cooperative
equilibrium does not feature export taxes it causes the terms-of-trade motive to be less
important in (7) and (8) than it would be with positive export taxes (compare (3) and (7)).
Politically-efficient, politically-dominant trade agreements
12 1 I define a politically-efficient, politically-dominant trade agreement as a (t,  t* ) pair where t
22 1 maximizes   given  t* , and t*  maximizes   given t .
For a politically efficient trade agreement,
with an analogous condition applying to good 2. Thus the politically efficient trade agree-
ment is characterized as follows.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 17
(9)
Proposition 7 With (A1) and (A2), the politically-efficient trade agreement is given by
(9). It need not constrain export taxes, since, with (A2), neither government would
wish to impose one.
Each efficient tariff consists of two political-support effects, reflecting the divergent interests
of the lobbies in the respective countries, together with a terms of trade effect redistributing
income in the direction of the country with the relatively larger sector. Note that the efficient
tariff might be either positive or negative (i. e., an import subsidy), but must be positive if
the domestic political support effect is sufficiently strong.
Remark 10 Proposition 7 offers a potential resolution of the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
V. Concluding  Remarks
The Received Theory of international trade agreements, the result of a half century of
research by international trade theorists, suffers from two fundamental puzzles that call into
question its relevance to reality. The Terms of Trade Puzzle: The Received Theory assumes
that the sole purpose of trade agreements is to address terms of trade externalities, but actual
GATT multilateral trade agreements just do not do this. The Anti Trade Bias Puzzle: Actual
trade policies have always tried to restrict trade much more often than they have tried to
stimulate it, but the models used by the Received Theory do not imply this result, unless
doctored up to produce it.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 18
To address these problems this paper has used a model, based on Grossman and Helpman
(2002), modified to allow each lobby a (realistic) comparative advantage in lobbying over
the policy instrument of direct relevance to it. This resulted in the following argument.
• An exercise of trade policy produces both a terms-of-trade effect and a political-support
effect for the government implementing the policy, plus both a terms-of-trade externality
and a political-support externality on the foreign government.
• If terms-of-trade motives dominate, each government will (counterfactually) employ both
import tariffs and export taxes in Nash equilibrium.
• If political-support effects dominate, in Nash equilibrium each government will (factu-
ally) tax imports, implement a countervailing duty law, and neither tax nor subsidize
exports. Neither government can unilaterally deliver anything to its export lobby. The
combination of political-support motives and Nash-equilibrium requirements thus offers a
resolution of the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
• If political-support effects dominate, the two governments have an incentive to negotiate
a trade agreement to be able to offer their export lobbies something (i.e., to exchange
market access). Such an agreement need not address export taxes and, therefore, offers a
resolution of the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
So, this paper offers a resolution of the two puzzles. But there is a cost: The presumed
dominance of terms-of-trade externalities, central to the Received Theory for half a century,
must be junked.Wilfred J. Ethier Page 19
References
Austen-Smith, D. (1991), “Rational Consumers and Irrational Voters,” ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS 3, 73–93.
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (1999), “An Economic Theory of GATT,” AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 89 (1), 215–248.
Bagwell, K. and R. W. Staiger (2002), THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM  (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press).
Ethier, W. J. (2004), “Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and A Multilateral World,”
forthcoming, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.
Goldberg, P. K. and G. Maggi (1999), “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation,”
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 84 (4), 1135–1155.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1994), "Protection for Sale," AMERICAN ECONOMIC
REVIEW 89 (5), 833–850.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (1995), "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," AMERI-
CAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 85 (4), 667–690.
Grossman, G.  M. and Helpman, E. (2002). INTEREST GROUPS AND TRADE POLICY.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Hillman, A. L. (1982), “Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives,”
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 72, 1180–1190.
Hillman, A. L. (1989), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROTECTION (Chur: Harwood
Academic Publishers).
Hillman, A. L. (1990), “Protectionist Policies as the Regulation of International Industry,”
PUBLIC CHOICE 67, 101–110.
Hillman, A. L., Long, N. V., and Moser, P. (1995), “Modeling Reciprocal Trade Liberaliza-
tion: the Political-economy and National-welfare Perspectives,” SWISS JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 131, 503-515.
Hillman, A. L. and P. Moser (1996), “Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange
of Market Access.” In: Canzoneri, M., W. J. Ethier, and V. Grilli [eds.], THE NEW
TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMY (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),  295–312.
Johnson, H. G. (1953-54), “Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation,”  REVIEW OF ECONOMIC
STUDIES 21, 142-153.
Levy, P. I. (1999), “Lobbying and International Cooperation in Tariff Setting,” JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 47, 345–370.Trade Agreements Based on Political Externalities Page 20
Magee, S. P. (1994), “Endogenous Protection: A Survey.” In: Mueller, D. C. [ed.], HAND-
BOOK OF PUBLIC CHOICE  (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell).
Nelson, D. (1988), “Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey,” AMERICAN JOURNAL
OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 32, 796–837.
Rodrik, D. (1995), “Political Economy of Trade Policy.” In: Grossman, G. and K. Rogoff
[eds.], HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Amsterdam: North-Holland),
1457–1495.